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Abstract
Agent(s) role in the implementation of policies is frequently considered as the determining 
factor for the success of policy implementation. This is reflected quite clearly in the “principle-
agent” theory that describes how self-interested agent influences the implementation process. 
However, is self-interested agent still relevant in explaining Indonesia’s broadcasting policy 
implementation? What if policy implementation involved many actors with their respective 
personal interests? How will agents position themselves amidst numerous personal interest-
bearing actors? By using the political economy approach, this research aims to reveal the role of 
agents in the constellation of actors’ relation to Indonesia’s broadcasting policy implementation. 
The operation of digital terrestrial free-to-air television broadcasting case is used to provide a 
reflection of agents’ position and political behavior in responding to the interest among actors. 
This research was conducted using the qualitative approach by implementing the data collection 
technique through in-depth interviews and document analysis. The research result shows that 
broadcasting policy implementation is not merely influenced by a self-interested agent but is 
also influenced by political interconnection and multiple-principles’ political-economic interest.
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Introduction
The 1998 political reform has provided 
an opportunity for reformists defenders of 
democracy to establish democratic institutions 
for supporting change into a better-improved 
course of order (Crouch, 2010). In the context 
of television broadcasting in Indonesia, this 
reform has driven changes in the television 
broadcasting system, from one that was 
authoritarian and centralistic into one that 
is democratic and decentralized (Pandjaitan 
& Siregar, 2003; Siregar, 2008). One of the 
manifestations of this change was the advent of 
Broadcasting Law number 32 of 2002, which is 
often considered to be a milestone of political 
change in Indonesian broadcasting.
In the Broadcasting Law, the path 
to realizing democratic and decentralized 
broadcasting has been made quite clear.  This 
course is explicitly stipulated in both the 
consideration section and main body of the 
Broadcasting Law. In the considerations, the 
objective of broadcasting operation is explicitly 
formulated, of which among others are: to 
guarantee the citizens’ right of convey their 
opinions and obtain information, to achieve 
public welfare in utilizing radio frequency 
spectrum as a limited natural resource, to 
maintain diversity of the Indonesian people, 
and to implement regional autonomy. The 
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main body of the Broadcasting Law has also 
regulated and acknowledged the presence 
of four types of broadcasting organization 
(public, private, community, and subscription 
broadcasting organizations) to guarantee 
diversity of contents and voices. The law 
contains regulation that prevents business 
monopoly and provides specifications on 
the distribution of authorities among the 
broadcasting regulatory institutions. 
Despite the stipulations having been 
explicitly written in the Broadcasting Law, a 
number of people, particularly broadcasting 
activists and civil society organizations, 
concerned with broadcasting issues in 
Indonesia (such as: Armando et al., 2011; 
Nugroho et al., 2012; Judhariksawan, 2013; 
Rianto et al., 2014; Heychael et al., 2014). They 
said, the implementation of the said law is not 
in accordance with the objective of the law. A 
case that is quite controversial relates to the 
Regulation of the Minister of Communication 
and Information Technology on the operation 
of digital terrestrial free-to-air television 
broadcasting. Several objections in relation to 
the omission of the Indonesian Broadcasting 
Commission’s (Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia – KPI) 
authority to manage digital broadcasting, the 
change of broadcasting system that caused the 
switch off from analog to digital, the advent of 
new broadcasting institution called multiplex 
broadcasting service institution that has the 
authority to lease frequencies, and biased 
industrial management over big television.2
This study was conducted to understand 
what is truly the interest of the state, of which 
in this case is the Ministry of Communication 
and Information Technology (Kementerian 
Komunikasi dan Informatika –Kemenkominfo), 
in issuing such policy? If the Minister of 
Communication and Information Technology 
(Menkominfo) is the implementer of the law, 
2 Summarized from the claim description delivered by 
ATVJI and ATVLI in claim document number 38P/
HUM/2012 and number 40.P/HUM/2012.
why was a policy that contradicts the mandate 
of the law made? Did agents have a self-interest 
in that incidence and if so, what is their self-
interest? What is the response of the legislative 
as the branch responsible for monitoring the 
executive, or the response of the Indonesia 
Broadcasting Commission in this case as the 
public’s representation? Even further, the 
researcher would like to explore the issue 
of political interconnectivity between actors 
and their interests in the operation of digital 
television broadcasting. 
Based on literature review results, it 
seems that studies on policy implementation 
have yet to touch on the roles and interests 
among actors. Initial studies on implementation 
were inclined to observe policy implementation 
from the administrative procedure aspect 
(Pressman & Widavsky, 1973). Scholars in 
this stage (such as van Meter & Horn, 1975, 
p. 462-476; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980) 
view the issue of implementation being 
caused by problems such as uncertainty of 
policy aspect, bureaucratic issues, low level 
of implementer reliability, and influence of 
societal surroundings. Implementers tend to be 
viewed as neutral and act based on rationality 
(Schofield, 2004; Matland, 1995). 
I n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  d e ve l o p m e n t , 
studies were found to be dominated by the 
assumption that implementers have control 
over implementation as they are regarded to 
be closer to and understand the actual issues 
occurring on the field. Those studies focused 
on target groups and service delivery. Those 
studies began with the target’s need for a policy 
(not with the policy), then the investigation 
moves upward toward the capacity of 
the implementer—how the implementer 
influenced behaviors and allocated resources 
to achieve policy objectives—, and ended with 
policy evaluation (Elmore, 1979). Through 
such procedure, the issue of implementation 
is seen as an impact of the agent’s capability 
to understand the target group and develop 
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appropriate service delivery strategy. The 
similarity of this research with previous studies 
is that the role and position of agent in policy 
implementation are considered as being neutral 
(Fischer, et al., 2015).
Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) have 
presented quite a comprehensive outlook 
in viewing the factors that influence policy 
implementation. They distinguish the factors 
influential to implementation into two: policy 
(content) and non-policy (context). The policy 
factor includes policy clarity, availability/
absence of-of study results serving as policy 
basis, financial resource sufficiency, integration 
of executing organization, recruitment of 
executing official, and formal access of executor 
to other organizations. The non-policy factors 
include social economic and technological 
conditions, media attention to policy issues, 
public support, attitude and resource of the 
main target group, commitment and authority 
support, and capacity of executing official.
Based on prior research, a study on actors 
remains unnoticed. Although a few studies 
on the subject exist, scholars tend to place 
them in a bureaucratic-procedural, hierarchic 
structure. This is, perhaps, brought about by 
the scholars’ point of view that is inclined to 
see implementation solely as a process of pure 
administration (Matland, 1995, p. 147-8). 
Positioning actors in such hierarchical 
structure would distance them from the reality 
that actors, including implementing agents, can 
or may act on the basis of personal or group 
interest and that the implementation process 
is satiated with political interests (Grindle & 
Thomas, 1989). This structure is also lacking in 
its observation of the reality that certain types of 
relationships among actors may also contribute 
to deviations in policy implementation. 
Herman and Chomsky (2002), for instance, 
show how political-economic interests, as 
witnessed in the compromise between capital 
owners or capitalists and regulators, led 
policy implementation to no longer become 
neutral and in the public interest, but is biased 
toward capitalistic interests instead. Due to 
such perspective, knowledge about how the 
interests of implementing agents, actors, and 
relations among actors actually influence policy 
implementation has not been much revealed. 
The main thesis of this research is 
developed from the basic assumption of the 
political economy theory, namely how political 
interconnection and political-economic interests 
among actors influence the proses of policy 
implementation in post-reform television 
broadcasting and the process subsequently 
deviated from the objective of the law to realize 
a democratic and decentralized broadcasting 
politics in Indonesia.
Before discussing the political economy 
theory, we should revisit the elaboration 
concerning the principle-agent theory and 
its explanation on how self-interested agent 
influence policy implementation. This 
discussion is provided so that later in the 
analysis section a comparison can be made 
whether the issue of policy implementation is 
determined more by a self-interested agent(s) 
or rather by the influence of principle(s) interest 
instead.
The principle-agent theory introduced 
by Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling 
(1976), explains that agent has a vital role 
in influencing policy. This theory places its 
concern on the relations that emerge when an 
individual or a group of individuals (principle) 
employs one or more people (agent) for the 
purpose of delegating responsibility. Hereby, 
the principle entrusts the control of the system 
in the hands of the agent and the agent with 
their afforded authority executes their duties. 
However, there is no guarantee that the agent 
will obey the instruction of the principle as the 
agent have the interest to maximize their own 
acquisition of profit. The basic premise of this 
theory is that all individuals are motivated 
solely by their own self-interest. Weber (1978) 
correlated the self-interested agent with 
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economic interest. Nevertheless, Goode (1997, 
p. 39-40) argues that self-interest also relates to 
the interest for power. This interest is linked 
to efforts in garnering the support of interest 
groups, obtaining support for campaign 
funding, or other supports/facilities.  
In connection with the implementation of 
broadcasting policy, the relationship between 
the principle and the agent may be different 
to the domain of accountancy which mostly 
manages the private domain as this theory 
was initially developed from. In the domain of 
broadcasting policy, there are quite a number 
of parties with their own interests because the 
issue at hand deals with the public domain, 
wherein the wider public has the right to 
the available resources and the state has 
the obligation of managing it fairly in order 
to realize social welfare. There is, thus, the 
possibility that there’s not just one principle 
in this case, but many layers of them. They 
all expect the agent to take the best measures 
in implementing the policy according to their 
expectations. Here, the researcher realized 
the limitation of the principle-agent theory in 
explaining the issue of policy implementation. 
A number of literature on political media 
economy (such as Underhill, 2000; Herman & 
Chomsky, 2002; Golding & Murdock, 1997; 
Graham, 2007; Mosco, 2009) show states under 
the control of capitalist groups. It is described 
in the literature that capitalist groups, namely 
capital owners and/or media entrepreneurs, are 
the most active and influential interest group 
when compared to other interest groups in 
influencing government elites. This very group 
also consistently acquires benefit from the 
government through the media policy that has 
been issued. This relation shows the presence 
of political connection among those actors 
wherein political; economic interest operates 
behind the issued policy.
Based on Mosco’s (2009) view, the 
capitalist group actively strives to influence 
government policy through lobbying and 
furnishing rewards to secure their interests. 
This capitalist group is dependent on the 
government as it is the institution that 
determines prevailing policies. This group 
also dominates relations due to the power of 
capital they own. The relationship between 
politics (power) and economy (capital) here is 
clearly a manifestation of a certain group’s (the 
capitalists) struggle. Various evidence showing 
power or dominance of the capitalist group in 
broadcasting cases can be examined through 
a number of studies, such as in Napoli (2001b) 
and Stavitsky (1994). 
An actual illustration of interests and 
political interconnection has been presented 
by Ambardi (2008) through the concept of the 
cartelized political party. Such cartelization was 
established in Indonesia following the general 
election process wherein competition among 
political parties no longer became obvious. 
Ambardi mentions that party competition 
ends after the election and it is subsequently 
followed by the making of a cartel. The origin 
of the cartelized party system is the collective 
dependency of various parties to engage in 
rent-seeking to fulfill their financial needs. 
This, in turn, creates a situation in which the 
party’s economic and political fate is linked 
as a collective. Their survival as individuals is 
determined by their capability to maintain the 
cartel’s existence. The common interest of the 
political parties to secure their financial needs 
compels them to place their representatives 
in the executive ministerial cabinet and in the 
leadership structure at the commission level of 
the Parliament (Ambardi, 2008). 
Based on the explanation above, the 
government as a representative of political 
party cartel may view their collaboration with 
the capitalist group as beneficial. In addition, 
the government may also see opportunities 
forrent-seeking in the world of broadcasting.
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Methods
This research employed the qualitative 
approach by applying the methods of in-depth 
interview and document analysis to gather 
data. In-depth interviews were conducted to 
obtain responses of actors connected to the 
operation of digital television broadcasting. 
The interviews are expected to show political 
relations and political-economic interests 
among the actors. The interviews were 
conducted for eight months (March until 
October 2017) by involving 48 respondents 
from Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Makassar and Bali. 
The informants consisted of the government 
(Kemenkominfo), KPI/KPID, private television 
broadcasting operators, regional government, 
National/Regional Legislative (DPR/DPRD), 
broadcasting activists and observers, and 
former officials who had held positions 
in the government, legislative body, or 
broadcasting regulatory body. Document 
analysis was conducted for the purpose of 
acquiring supporting data that relates to the 
political actions carried out by the actors, their 
interests, and how the relations among actors 
were established. 
The data analysis of the study results 
was carried out in several stages. Firstly, the 
researcher classified the results of document 
analysis based on certain themes relating to 
the study matter. Secondly, the researcher 
transcribed all data obtained from the 
interviews into a verbatim format and applied 
coding. The coding result was subsequently 
classified into themes as well. The data 
obtained from document analysis was also 
classified. Thirdly, once all the data have 
been collected according to the themes, the 
researcher applied matching patterns to find 
similarities or differences in them. Fourthly, 
based on the above stages, the researcher made 
a conclusion in order to answer the research 
question. 
Result
Actors with Interest
The researcher have identified at least 
six actors (group of actors) that had an interest 
in television broadcasting in Indonesia and 
they showed that they actively responded 
to policies, particularly those relating to the 
Minister of Communication and Information 
Technology Regulation (Permenkominfo) on 
the operation of digital terrestrial television 
broadcasting (namely Permenkominfo 22 of 
2011 and Permenkominfo 32 of 2013). The 
six actors were the Indonesian Broadcasting 
Commission (KPI-Pusat (national) and KPI-
Daerah (regional)), Jakarta private television 
broadcasting institutions with national 
broadcast coverage (which will subsequently 
be called Jakarta-TV) and their corresponding 
associations (such as, the Indonesian Private 
Television Association/ATVSI), local private 
television broadcasting institutions (which 
will subsequently be called Local-TV) and their 
corresponding associations (such as ATVLI 
and ATVJI), civil society organizations and 
their affiliates (such as KIDP, SIKA, KNRP), the 
People’s Representative Council (DPR), and the 
government.3
The Indonesian Broadcasting Commission 
in the Broadcasting Law (Article 7 verse 2) is 
stated to be “an independent state institution 
that regulates broadcasting related matters.” 
However, the authority of this institution had 
long been curtailed due to a judicial review in 
20034 that rendered the KPI to merely retain the 
3 Aside from the six actors, there were also others such 
as the Public Broadcasting Institutions (TVRI and RRI), 
community broadcasting institutions, etc. that will voice 
their concerns in relation to the broadcasting policy. 
However, these institutions are not included in the 
discussion of this article as the focus of study is aimed 
at the issue of commercial broadcasting operation.  
4 The trimming began with a judicial review case 
challenging the Broadcasting Law that was filed by the 
Indonesian Television Journalists Association (IJTI), 
the Indonesian National Private Radio Broadcasting 
Association (PRSSNI), the Indonesian Association of 
Advertising Agencies (PPPI), the Indonesian Television 
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authority of regulating contents. Although its 
authority had been reduced, interview results 
with a number of KPI commissioners show that 
the institution remains motivated and interested 
in being involved in regulating Indonesian 
broadcasting. KPI is also expectant of obtaining 
funding allocation from the National Budget 
(APBN) to support its work programs and to 
make it become more independent.5
Jakarta-TV6 and their accommodating 
institution, such as the ATVSI, had an interest 
in defending their business position and 
gaining profit from the broadcasting business 
that they had established and develop.7This 
institution expected the government through 
the regulations they make to provide legal 
certainty and guarantee concerning the 
continuity of their business. Additionally, 
these institutions also intend to develop their 
businesses, be it those related to the world of 
broadcasting or those that aren’t (Rianto et al., 
2014; Lim, 2011). All this time, big televisions 
that are gathered in ATVs have more than 100% 
control of the national private television shares. 
Given this position, they reap a substantial 
profit of trillions of rupiah per annum.8
Broadcasting Association (ATVSI), Indonesian Dubbing 
Association (PERSUSI), and the Indonesian Television 
Community (KOMTEVE). These organizations among 
others stated their objection to KPI’s authority as 
it is regarded to have the potential of eliminating 
freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and 
freedom of broadcasting institutions. Although the 
Constitutional Court (MK) defended KPI’s position, 
it has fundamentally reduced KPI’s authority as a 
regulator. 
5 KPI currently has funding allocation as well as human 
resource from Kemenkominfo.
6 The television stations meant here are RCTI, Global TV, 
MNC TV (included in MNC Group), SCTV, Indosiar 
(EMTEC Group), ANTV, TVOne (Bakrie & Brothers), 
Trans TV, Trans 7 (Trans Corpora), and Metro TV (Media 
Group).
7 Interview with Gilang Iskandar (Corporate Secretary of 
SCTV and ATVSI manager), in Jakarta, May 16, 2017.
8 As an illustration, the advertisement income in 2015 
for RCTI reached Rp 9.9 trillion, SCTV Rp 8.8 trillion, 
Indosiar Rp 7 trillion, ANTV Rp 6.6 trillion, Global TV 
Rp 5.4 trillion, Trans7 Rp 5.1 trillion, Trans TV Rp 4.525 
trillion, TV One Rp 4.5 trillion, and Metro TV Rp 2.9 
Local-TV and their accommodating 
institutions, such as ATVLI and ATVJI, had the 
interest to develop their broadcast in the region 
and expected the government to be committed 
to developing a healthy broadcasting industry. 
All this time, Local-TV is of the view that they 
are a victim of government injustice, as in the 
case of channel allocation in the region9. Local 
television operators think there are many 
channels provided for Jakarta-TV rather than 
Local-TV. They stated their disappointment 
as the practice of network broadcasting 
system did not involve them.10 Additionally, 
they are dissatisfied with the government’s 
stance of allowing deviant practices carried 
out by members of Jakarta-TV networks in 
operating local television to continue because 
some television stations do not have and 
do not broadcast local programs; if they do 
broadcast them, they will broadcast them 
during “graveyard slots” (with low amount 
of viewers) since prime time, and other slots 
have been taken up by programs relayed from 
Jakarta.11
Activists and civil society organizations 
that were also quite active in responding to 
broadcasting policies are KIDP12, SIKA13, and 
trillion. This data was quoted from “Rajai Iklan Indonesia, 
Tiga Stasiun TV Milik Hary Tanoe Raup Rp 23,2Triliun”. 
Retrieved July 8, 2017 from http://bisniskeuangan.
kompas.com/read/2015/12/10/160000126/Rajai.Iklan.
Indonesia.Tiga.Stasiun.TV.Milik.Hary.Tanoe.Raup.
Rp.23.2.Triliun
9 Researcher’s interviews with Local TV operators in 2017. 
10Interview with Muannas (Celebes TV), in Makassar, 
March 24, 2017.
11 Researcher’s interviews with Local TV operators in 2017. 
12KIDP is a civil society alliance advocating for more 
democratic Indonesian broadcasting regulators and 
regulation. The members of KIDP comprises of: AJI 
Jakarta, AJI Indonesia, Alwari (Indonesian Alliance of 
Radio Journalists), ICJR (Institute for Criminal Justice 
Reform), Indonesian Community Radio Network (JRKI), 
LBH Pers, Development and Press Research Institute 
(LSPP), Media Link, Media Regulators and Regulation 
Monitor (PR2Media), Remotivi, 28 Foundation, Ladang 
Media Foundation, Tifa Foundation.
13Members from ICJR, LBH Pers, Elsam, AJI.
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KNRP.14 This organization, or association to 
be exact, is a civil society alliance with the 
interest of advocating for a democratic digital 
broadcasting system. They actively conduct 
studies, state their position, draft policy briefs, 
compose press releases, hold press conferences, 
write opinions on the media, hold dialogs 
with DPR, and compose a revision draft of the 
Broadcasting Law. 
Although DPR wields the authority of 
drafting legislation and monitoring government 
administration, this state institution tends to be 
passive in responding to the implementation 
of the Broadcasting Law. A number of activists 
representing civil society organizations 
revealed that position statements, policy briefs, 
and discussion proceedings from hearings at 
the council were mostly not followed up by 
DPR. Additionally, the stance and interest of 
DPR members may drastically differ from one 
period to the next. Ade Armando’s experience 
in applying for the KPI member selection shows 
that there is a difference between the 2004-2007 
period and the 2007-2010 period (Armando 
et al., 2011). He considered the strong stance 
of DPR to have vanished, this is observed 
from the acceptance of several names of KPI 
candidates recommended by ATVSI, although 
the candidate application process had already 
been closed. Armando also received criticism 
from Council members for criticizing a number 
of regulations made by the government, while 
in fact the exact same regulation was once 
requested by the previous period DPR to be 
postponed. The DPR’s accommodative stance 
toward the government seems to be reinforced 
in the 2007-2010 period. 
The government may be considered to 
play a central role in the implementation of 
broadcasting policy. This institution has taken 
over some of the strategic roles of television 
14KNRP has more than 160 members consisting of 
scholars and practitioners along with 20 civil society 
organizations that are concerned with broadcasting 
that is democratic, fair, and inclined to public interest.
broadcasting regulation upon the judicial review 
ruling that provided the authority to decree 
governmental regulations, which functions 
to provide a more operational elaboration on 
the implementation of the Broadcasting Law. 
KPI, which in the initial composition of the law 
was expected to function as an independent 
regulatory body, due to political movements 
attempting to restrict its role, had been merely 
afforded the authority to regulating contents. 
In a number of issues dealing with permits, KPI 
assumes no more than a supplementary role to 
the government. The government’s interest in 
broadcasting seems to be connected to the efforts 
of reinstating the supremacy of broadcasting 
regulator in the hands of the government.15 
Relations among Actors
Actors with quite varied interests show 
relations that were far from being harmonious 
and were marked by a number of conflicts that 
involved the court. In the case of Permenkominfo 
(Communication and Information Technology 
Ministerial Regulation) on the operation 
of digital television broadcasting, I have 
categorized the groups into proponents (pros) 
and opponents (cons). The proponents of the 
Permenkominfo, among others, were KPI, 
Jakarta-TV (including ATVSI), and DPR. The 
opponents, among others, were Local-TV 
(including associations of ATVLI and ATVJI) 
and civil society organizations. 
The proponents were basically of the 
view that the ministerial regulation (permen) 
provides a solution to the limitation of channels, 
it provides greater opportunity for the public 
to establish television stations, it advances the 
broadcasting industry, and provides better 
program services to the public.
15It is evident in Permenkominfo No. 22 Year 2011 on 
the operation of digital terrestrial free to air television. 
In articles 10, 13, 19, 23 and 25 that regulate digital 
broadcasting, including permit, is carried out by the 
minister. Not a single provision stated the role of KPI 
in it.    
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KPI supports the Permenkominfo since 
they consider it important under the current 
conditions to provide support so that KPI 
has a role in the digitalization team16. This 
stance seems to have made KPI keep silent 
about the permen. By holding this position, it 
means that KPI is no longer much concerned 
with the public’s rejection of the regulation. 
This position confirms my view that KPI is no 
longer committed as a “manifestation of public 
participation that functions to accommodate 
aspirations and represent public interest 
concerning broadcasting issues,” as stipulated 
in Article 8 (verse 1) of the Broadcasting Law. 
While this institution was quite critical to a 
number of governmental regulations deemed 
biased to the industry in its initial establishment, 
in the subsequent periods this institution 
tended to be passive and compromised with 
policies issued by the government.
Jakarta-TV and ATVSI supported the 
ministerial regulation based on a number of 
reasons: changes in broadcasting technology 
are inevitable, the opportunity for improving 
broadcasting service quality, and also 
broadcasting business progress. Their support 
to the Permenkominfo had already been 
predicted because since digital broadcast had 
been initiated by the government in 2007, this 
institution had participated as a part of the 
Indonesian Digital Television Consortium 
(KTDI). This institution had also participated 
in the digital broadcast trial that was carried 
out in 2008. There was never any significant 
conflict between Jakarta-TV (and ATVSI) 
and the government concerning the issued 
broadcasting policies. This is because the 
government policies on broadcasting had 
16Presented during a Focused Discussion on the Problems 
of Digital Television Broadcast in Indonesia, held 
by the Independent Journalists Alliance (AJI) and 
Tifa Foundation in Jakarta, Wednesday, February 
26, 2014. Source: “Soal Digitalisasi Televisi, KPI 
Seharusnya Dilibatkan”, Retrieved from http://www.
antaranews.com/berita/421097/soal-digitalisasi-televisi-
kpi-seharusnya-dilibatkan, July 12, 2017.
always been inclined to the interests of those 
television stations.17
In  th i s  case ,  DPR regarded the 
digitalization of television broadcasting as an 
important program to implement in line with 
current technological development. However, 
DPR, or Commission I to be precise, agreed 
that the digitalization process must have a legal 
umbrella in the form of legislation. Commission 
I DPR had, thus, made an initiative to revise the 
Broadcasting Law to include the broadcasting 
digitalization process in it. According to 
the Chairperson of Commission I DPR RI, 
Mahfudz, this digital permen is risky because if 
something were to happen, the minister would 
be held accountable, because the legal umbrella 
is a ministerial regulation.18
Meanwhile, the opponents are basically 
of the view that the broadcasting operation 
policy does not have a legal basis, the substance 
of the regulation contradicts the Broadcasting 
Law, the policy neglects the capacity of Local-
TV, and there is bias to the more stable Jakarta-
TV.
Local-TV and their associations (ATVLI 
and ATVJI) rejected the Permenkominfo 
because they sense injustice and discrimination 
in the policy. Through ATVLI and ATVJI 
they emphasized that they are not against 
digital broadcasting but rather the regulation 
of it. ATVLI objected to a number of things, 
17Governmental Regulation (PP) No. 50 year 2005 on 
the Broadcasting Operation of Private Broadcasting 
Institutions, the government had also provided special 
treatment to these institutions at least in two things, 
namely: regulation on share ownership (stipulated in 
article 32 verse (3) of PP. No. 50 year 2002) and regulation 
on coverage of broadcast area in the operation of 
network broadcasting (as stipulated on article 36, point 
f PP No. 50 year 2002). 
18Presented during a Focused Discussion on the Problems 
of Digital Television Broadcast in Indonesia, held by 
the Independent Journalists Alliance (AJI) and Tifa 
Foundation in Jakarta, Wednesday, February 26, 2014. 
Source: “Soal Digitalisasi Televisi, KPI Seharusnya 
Dilibatkan”, Retrieved July 12, 2017 http://www.
antaranews.com/berita/421097/soal-digitalisasi-televisi-
kpi-seharusnya-dilibatkan
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among them were: KPI was not involved in 
digital broadcasting operation, the presence of 
multiplexing agents and the selection criteria 
which favors strong investors with broadcasting 
license, the obligation of collaborating with 
multiplexing agents in order to broadcast, 
the position of broadcasting institutions 
restricted to mere content providers, and so 
on. Since the government and KPI did not 
listen to their complaints, some of the parties, 
among them the Indonesian Local Television 
Association (ATVLI) and the Indonesian 
Network Television Association (ATVJI) 
has brought the digitalization case to court. 
They demand the annulment of a number of 
ministerial decrees and regulations relating to 
digitalization. 
Civil society organizations with their 
affiliates rejected the Permenkominfo with 
a number of reasons, namely: it has no legal 
umbrella, it substantively contradicts the 
Broadcasting Law, the policy is considered 
to perpetuate ownership practices in the 
broadcasting industry,19and it also threatens 
the existence of Local-TV. KIDP, for instance, 
stated that Menkominfo had discriminated 
certain parties in the process of broadcasting 
digitalization.20
Political Actions of Agents
In an interview with Henry Subiyakto, a 
researcher and expert staffer of the Ministry of 
Communication and Information Technology, 
he stated that the drafting of the permenkominfo 
employed three legal bases, namely the 
Broadcasting Law (in the elucidation section), 
PP No. 11 of 2005, and PP No. 50 of 2005. Did 
the three legal bases truly serve as a reference 
19This explanation is quoted from a press release 
published by KIDP on July 19, 2012 entitled “KIDP 
Himbau Menkominfo Menunda Seleksi Multipleksing.”
20Ahmad Budiman (2012). Menyoal kebijakan Digitalisasi 
Penyiaran. Info singkat Vol. V, No. 20/II/P3DI/
Oktober/2012. Retrieved August 23, 2017 from http://
berkas.dpr.go.id/puslit/files/info_singkat/Info%20
Singkat-V-20-I-P3DI-Oktober-2013-20.pdf.
in the operation of digital broadcasting? Based 
on Law No. 12 of 2011 on Establishment of 
Laws and Regulations (article 8 verse 2), it is 
stipulated that laws and regulations (including 
ministerial regulations) are acknowledged and 
have binding legal authority by fulfilling two 
requirements: first, mandated by a higher tier of 
laws and regulations, and second, made based 
on authority. 
Based on the article by article search of the 
Broadcasting Law, 10 provisions were found to 
give a mandate to the government in making 
regulations.21 Among the ten provisions, not a 
single one mentioned anything about digital 
broadcasting. The same results were acquired 
when a number of governmental regulations 
relating to the broadcasting operation were 
searched22 in which there was not a single 
article that explicitly directs the minister to 
make a ministerial regulation on the operation 
of digital broadcasting. This means that the 
first requirement for the Permenkominfo to be 
acknowledged has not been met. 
As mentioned above, the presence of 
KPI as a regulator is basically unwanted by the 
principles because of its possibility of disrupting 
their interests. However, it is impossible to 
truly eliminate it since the principles would 
be confronted with the public and civil society 
organizations that would not let KPI be 
21Article 14  verse (10) on Public Broadcasting Institutions; 
article 18 verse (3) on organization of quantity and 
coverage of local, regional, and national broadcasting 
areas, for broadcasting services; article 18 verse (4) on 
the restriction of ownership and control and restriction 
of cross ownership; article 29 verse (2) on licensing 
procedures and requirements; and so forth. . 
22 PP No. 11 of 2005 on Public Broadcasting Institutions, PP 
No. 12 of 2005 on RRI Public Broadcasting Institution, PP 
No. 13 of 2005 on TVRI Public Broadcasting Institution, 
PP No. 49 of 2005 on Foreign Broadcasting Institutions, 
PP No. 50 of 2005 on Broadcasting Operation of 
Private Broadcasting Institutions, PP No. 51 of 2005 on 
Broadcasting Operation of Community Broadcasting 
Insitution, PP No. 52 of 2005 on Broadcasting Operation 
of Subscription Broadcasting Institutions, PP No. 7 of 
2009 on Types and Tariffs for Non-Tax State Revenue 
Items that apply at the Department of Communication 
and Information Technology.
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removed. The Minister had very proficiently 
articulated the principles’ desire by reinforcing 
his authority. The actions taken by the Minister 
is apparent through his Permenkominfo No. 22 
of 2011 and Permenkominfo No. 32 of 2013. In 
both regulations, the Minister serves as a single 
ruler in providing operational licenses for 
broadcast program operators and multiplexing 
operators.
To increase spectrum usage efficiency, 
Kemenkominfo issued Permenkominfo No. 
5 of 2012 on Digital Terrestrial Free-to-Air 
Television Broadcasting Standards which 
determined the use of DVB-T2 technology 
as the broadcasting operation technology 
in Indonesia.23 With this technology, one 
channel of multiplexing (mux) will be able to 
channel as many as 12 channels for television 
broadcasting. Kemenkominfo also established 
the amount of multiplexing (mux) channels that 
will be open for every service area to be 6. Five 
mux to be allocated for private broadcasting 
operation24 and one mux for the community 
and public broadcasting operation.25 Based 
on the regulation, it is predicted that there 
will be approximately 4,572 channels that 
may potentially be used for private television 
broadcasting operation. 
23This Permen replaced Permen No. 7 of 2007 on 
Digital Terrestrial Broadcasting Standards for Fixed 
Reception Television in Indonesia which had established 
DVB-T (Digital Video Broadcasting-Terrestrial) as the 
broadcasting operational technology in Indonesia.
24It is stated in Permenkominfo No. 17 of 2012 on 
the Implementation of establishing multiplexing 
broadcasting operation and also Permenkominfo No. 6 
of 2013 on the Amendment to the ministerial regulation 
No. 17 of 2012 on the Implementation of establishing 
multiplexing broadcasting operation.
25It is stated in Permenkominfo No. 22 of 2011 (article 
11) “the Minister establishes TVRI Public Broadcasting 
Institution as an LPPPM that applies nationally without 
having to undergo a selection process to use 1 (one) 
channel of radio frequency in every service area.” 
And Permenkominfo No. 32 of 2013 (article 14) “the 
Minister establishes LPP TVRI to operate Multiplexing 
Broadcasting through a Terrestrial System that applies 
nationally by using one channel of radio frequency in 
every service area.”
In the operation of digital broadcasting, 
the Minister even initiated the multiplexing 
operating organization. This institution 
was designed to later manage the digital 
broadcasting infrastructure so that program 
operating institutions can broadcast the 
contents they produce. In determining the 
institution, the Minister issued Permenkominfo 
No. 32 of 2013 and Permenkominfo No. 6 
of 2013.26 In the ministerial regulation it is 
stated that the institutions allowed to operate 
multiplexing, among others are: LPS (other 
than LPP-TVRI) that already has operating 
broadcasting license, has sufficient existing 
infrastructure and human resource, and has the 
capacity to pay bond money both bid bondand 
performance bond of which amount may reach 
up to hundreds of million rupiah.
With such huge sum of bond money, 
very few local television stations will be able to 
afford it. In some of the local television stations 
that the researcher visited, such as Celebes TV 
(Makassar), Fajar TV (Makassar), Jogja TV, 
RBTV, and AdiTV (these three are based in 
Yogyakarta), the operators were not approving 
of the bond money sum required. The tender 
system established by the government was also 
considered to have ignored the capacity of local 
television stations.
It is evident here that the government 
had purposely created a barrier to entry in the 
broadcasting industry. Based on the selection 
criteria, the Ministry of Communication and 
Information Technology had succeeded in 
selecting and determining thirty-three (33) 
multiplexing operating institutions. It was 
proven that most of these institutions were 
big television broadcasting institutions and/or 
their affiliates that had always been dominating 
television broadcasting in Indonesia, namely: 
RCTI, SCTV, Indosiar, ANTV, TV One, Trans 
26Ministerial regulation on the Amendment to the 
Minister ia l  Regulat ion No.  17  year  2012 on 
the Implementation of establishing multiplexing 
broadcasting operation.
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TV, TV7 and Metro TV.
Aside from fulfilling the interest of 
Jakarta-TV, the Minister also very adeptly 
responded to the interest of political parties 
in terms of their intention to own television 
stations. How several television stations were 
exploited by the owners for political campaign 
purposes in the 2014 General Election seem to 
have instigated other political parties that did 
not own one to do so. In the Broadcasting Law, 
political parties are not allowed to establish 
or own television stations because only four 
broadcasting institutions are regarded as valid, 
namely: subscription, community, private, and 
public broadcasting institutions. Community 
broadcasting institution here is emphasized 
to be independent and founded by the non-
partisan community, and the presence of the 
institution is not for propaganda interest of 
a certain group. Additionally, the limitation 
of the analog channel makes it impossible for 
them to establish a television station. However, 
with the operation of digital broadcasting, in 
which there are much more digital channels 
available, it enables them to establish one. This 
limitation had “momentarily” driven political 
parties, like PKS, to broadcast via YouTube.27.The 
magnitude of political party interest became 
obvious with the emergence of the Broadcasting 
Law draft composed by DPR (version February 
6, 2017) which mentions a clause on special 
broadcasting by allowing political parties to 
operate broadcasting stations.
Political party interest also relates to 
political communication. Politicians often 
contact television station operators to obtain 
talking space through their media. Some 
would request the television stations to cover 
their party events, invite the party figures 
as speakers, and even contact the media to 
broadcast private events, such as birthdays 
27Interview with the Head of PR DPP-PKS (at the time), 
Dedi Supriadi, in Jakarta, July 25, 2017.
and the like.28
For the government’s own interest, the 
Minister attempted to boost Non-Tax State 
Revenue (PNBP). The Minister set targets 
of PNBP receipt and proudly announced 
them to the public when it had exceeded the 
target. In terms of broadcasting, PNBP came 
from radio frequency usage fee. However, 
I examined that the target of PNBP was not 
only directed at the broadcasting industry 
but from the telecommunication industry 
as well. Syaifudin (Sub-Section Head of 
Broadcasting at the Ministry of Communication 
and Information Technology)29 in an interview 
with the researcher stated that a much more 
significant sum is acquired from the frequency 
rental income for telecommunication. In brief 
before the press, Tifatul Sembiring, who 
was the Minister of Communication and 
Information Technology at the time, even said 
that PNBP from the telecommunication sector 
is the second highest following the revenue 
acquired by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources. Most of the PNBP receipts were 
from the Directorate General of Information 
and Postal Equipment and Resources, that is 
from frequency rentals for telecommunication 
industry purposes.30
Discussion
This study has identified several actors 
with interest in the implementation of television 
broadcasting policy in Indonesia. The presence 
of these actors could not be so easily placed 
as principles or agent(s) due to their layered 
28Interview with Satria Narada/Bali TV (in Denpasar, 
July 12, 2017) and Kadek/SCTV Bali (in Denpasar, July 
17, 2017)
29 Interview conducted in Jakarta, May 4, 2017.
30 Source from Press Release No. 2/PIH/Kominfo/2013. 
“Tingkat capaian dan prestasi Kementerian Kominfo 
tahun 2012” https://ppidkemkominfo.files.wordpress.
com/2013/01/siaran-pers-awal-tahun-20131.pdf and 
news “PNBP Kominfo capai Rp 11,5 Triliun”. Retrieved 
August 22, 2017 from https://kominfo.go.id/content/
detail/1512/pnbp-kominfo-capai-rp115-triliun/0/berita
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roles and positions. Beginning with the 
principle-agent theory, the principle is the 
party employing the agent for the purpose of 
delegating responsibility. This means there is a 
formal structural line of command that connects 
the principle to the agent. Hence, neither of the 
actors explained above can be considered as a 
principle(s) nor agent(s). The relation showing 
principle-agent connection is observed between 
DPR-minister/government. However, if we 
were to dig deeper by considering ministerial 
appointment by the president, and DPR 
(nomination of legislative members) from 
political parties, then we can see that there is a 
tiered principle-agent relation, that is political 
party-DPR-president (and vice president)-
minister. Since KPI is basically mandated by 
the Broadcasting Law to manage to broadcast 
along with the government, then KPI can also 
be considered as an agent. An illustration of the 
multi principles and agent may be as follows:
Figure 1.
Principle-agent Connection
Source: research result
This tiered position and relation do 
not seem to correspond with the control or 
monitoring function that should be carried 
out. As mentioned earlier, Permenkominfo on 
the operation of digital television broadcasting 
ended with an annulment by the MA. The 
digitalization process that had been undergoing 
due process is currently at a standstill. Amidst 
the controversy, there are nearly no voices 
heard be it from the president, DPR, and 
political parties, as well as KPI, commenting 
on the minister’s initiative in creating and 
maintaining the regulation. Only DPR stated 
their support while reminding the need to 
wait for a legal umbrella; the rest is silent. This 
silence is a political stance. This stance may be 
understood as a position of support; comments 
may perhaps be unnecessary since the agent 
has been entrusted to carry out its duties with 
the given authority. This position may also be 
understood as an effort to ‘develop an image’ 
due to the arguably significant public resistance 
to the policy. A wrong stance may have a 
negative impact on one’s image and would 
subsequently affect their votes. DPR invited the 
minister several times to discuss the operation 
of digital television broadcast, but the sessions 
were more about listening to elaborations 
from the minister rather than reminding and 
instructing ministerial policy to be in line with 
the mandate of the Broadcasting Law.31
How is it possible that there is a uniformed 
stance in responding to the digital policy given 
the tiered position and relation? This study 
shows that there are political interconnection 
and common interest among the principles as 
well as the agent. As illustrated by Ambardi 
(2008) in “cartelized political party,” after the 
general election, competition among political 
parties ends. The ensuing process is the formation 
of cartels wherein political parties that once 
competed engage in collaboration and mutually 
work together to maintain their survival. The 
common interest of political parties compels 
them to place their representatives in the cabinet 
and in leadership boards at the commission level 
in the Parliament (Ambardi, 2008). That is the 
reason why a different position in an institution 
does not necessarily mean a different person 
since the individuals positioned there are their 
people as well. Hence, it is very commonplace 
that their voices be in tune when facing particular 
31Results of examining transcripts of the Public Hearing 
(RDPU) with Commission I DPR RI, April 6, 2015. 
“Digitalisasi Penyiaran Televisi - Rapat Komisi 1 dengan 
Asosiasi Televisi Siaran Digital Indonesia”. Retrieved 
July 19, 2017 from http://www.tvdigitaljogja.tv/2015/06/
digitalisasi-penyiaran-televisi-rapat.html
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issues. In the case of the ministerial regulation 
on digitalization (No. 22 year 2011 and 32 year 
2013) for example, we can see the political 
interconnection between the President (Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, from the Democratic Party, 
PKS one of its main supporters), the Minister 
(Tifatul Sembiring, from the Democratic Party), 
Chair of Commission I (Mahfid Siddiq from the 
Democratic Party), and the Democratic Party 
(as the winner of the 2009 legislative election by 
acquiring 150 seats (26,4%)). 
How is this interconnection linked to 
the capitalist group, such as Jakarta-TV? It is 
known that media conglomerates have close 
relations with politicians and some politicians 
are media owners as well. These media owners 
openly show their political affiliations (Lim, 
2011) and some are even positioned as party 
leader. As elaborated by Merlyna Lim (2011), 
Surya Paloh, who is the chair at Media Group 
is also a leader in the National Democratic 
(Nasdem) Party. Paloh was also the chair of 
the Golkar Party’s board of advisors. Aburizal 
Bakrie who is head of the Bakrie & Brothers 
group was the chairman of the Golkar Party. 
Chairul Tanjung who owns Trans TV and 
Trans 7 has close ties to former president Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono. Hary Tanoesudibjo who 
is a leader in MNC Group was a prominent 
figure in Hanura and is currently the chairman 
of the Perindo Party with close ties to several 
figures in a number of influential parties. Under 
such conditions, the interest of political parties 
and the interest of the media is intertwined and 
is difficult to untangle.
Among the principles and agent above, 
the actor bearing the potential to become 
an opposition is KPI. Yet, KPI is no stranger 
to the DPR and to the capitalist group. The 
interview with a KPI commissioner candidate 
who is a former DPR member shows that 
the KPI commissioner selection process is 
far from being objective.32 DPR through the 
32Interview with Kristiawan/applicant to KPI-Central (in 
factions displays interest in making deals with 
the commissioner candidates who intend to 
garner support. This does not only happen at 
the national level but at the regional as well 
in the KPID selection by the DPRD.33 The 
accommodating candidate will gain support 
from the faction/party throughout the selection 
process. Such is also the case with the industry, 
in which they conduct a “silent operation” 
by lobbying council members and factions to 
recommend the commissioner candidates they 
consider supportive of their interests.34
In order to operate digital television 
broadcasting, the Minister had taken a risk 
by acting outside the legal jurisdiction. Such 
audacity surely had strong reasoning behind 
it. One of the possibilities is that the Minister 
was an ‘ally’ and executor of a mandate from 
political elites who held control of the state. This 
fact concurrently indicates that the agent of the 
act undertake more significantly influenced by 
the common interest of the principles rather 
than the self-interest of the agent. The agent in 
this case truly functioned as a representative or 
delegation of the principles in accomplishing 
their interest. What the agent had done was 
none other than what the principles desired.
Conclusion
In  exploring the issue of  pol icy 
implementation, it is imperative to understand 
political interconnection and common 
interest among actors. This study shows that 
self-interested agent is not the main actor 
who determines the orientation of policy 
implementation. Multiple-principles, namely 
political parties, DPR, President, who are the 
Jakarta, May 16, 2017) and Paulus Widiyanto/former 
DPR Commission I member (in Jakarta, May 18, 2017).
33 Interview with Muliartha/former KPID-Bali (in 
Denpasar, July 13, 2017).
34 Summary of interviews with Kristiawan/applicant 
to KPI-Central (in Jakarta, May 16, 2017) and Paulus 
Widiyanto/ former DPR Commission I member (in 
Jakarta, May 18, 2017).
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political elites and controller of the state have 
more influence on policy implementation. 
These multiple-principles are established 
through party cartelization. They strive to 
accumulate power, and they mutually struggle 
to accomplish their interest. For that, they 
employ their ‘people’ to occupy strategic 
government positions. The agents are nothing 
more than an extension of their authority, and 
they play a vital role in actualizing the mandate 
of the principles. 
In relation to television broadcasting 
operation, the interest of the principle 
intertwined with the television capitalist 
group. Even some of the principles were also 
media owners and/or had good relations with 
media owners. Within the constellation of 
such relationship, the agent submits to the 
principles. The Minister of Communication 
and Information Technology’s policy which 
was manifested in the ministerial regulation 
on the operation of digital terrestrial free-to-
air television broadcasting was an indication 
of such submission. In order to issue the 
regulation, the Minister dared to take a risk 
without considering Local-TV and public 
aspirations as well as existing laws and 
regulations. The regulation was clearly biased 
to the interest of political elites and the capitalist 
group. The result of the study provides a 
substantial contribution to the development 
of the principle-agent theory in examining 
policy implementation issues. This study also 
shows that capitalistic (economic) interest had 
not only affected the government’s political 
actions. It was rather much more extensive 
than that, the economic interest among the 
principle(s) and also the agent(s) had led to the 
emergence of a number of political actions in 
the implementation of post-reform Indonesian 
broadcasting policy. 
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